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Abstract 
 
 
 Although the American public is divided on many policies, the majority of 
Americans (commonly close to 60%) continue to support a relatively controversial form 
of military technology: lethal drone strikes used to target terrorists in foreign countries. 
This study seeks to determine what factors affect American public approval of lethal 
drone strikes and which factor yields the greatest impact on support. Four main 
arguments for and against drone strikes are explored—military effectiveness, military 
ineffectiveness, violations of international law, and increased ease of military 
intervention. Employing a survey experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I find that 
international law concerns produce the most substantial negative impact on approval; that 
is, respondents exposed to the International Law treatment are the most likely to 
disapprove of US usage of lethal drone strikes. The other experimental conditions 
resulted in slight increases in approval; however, the degree of these changes is relatively 
inconsequential. This study also shows that identification as a Republican, 
Hispanic/Latino origin, prior service in the armed forces, and having a relationship to 
someone who has served in the military are the most significant predictors of approval. 
Conversely, females are significantly more likely to disapprove of lethal drone strikes. 
These findings answer questions about not only what underpins public attitudes regarding 
lethal drone strikes, but also how these determinants could apply to public approval of 
increasingly autonomous weaponry systems.  
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“The program is not perfect. No military program is. But here is the bottom line: 
It works. I think it is fair to say that the targeted killing program has been the most 
precise and effective application of firepower in the history of armed conflict. It disrupted 
terrorist plots and reduced the original Qaeda organization along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border to a shell of its former self.”  
– Michael V. Hayden, 2016 New 
York Times article, “To Keep America Safe, 
Embrace Drone Warfare”  
 
"[W]hen counterterrorism efforts neglect the rule of law at the national and international 
levels and violate international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and 
fundamental freedoms, they not only betray the values they seek to uphold, but they can 
also fuel violent extremism...”  
– Maleeha Lodhi, July 2016 speech 
to 110th plenary meeting of United Nations’ 
General Assembly Seventieth Session  
        
 
Introduction 
In the current age of increasingly polarized partisan politics, issues that enjoy a 
majority of American public support across party lines have become rare. In spite of this, 
in a national survey conducted by Pew Research Center in May 2015, 58% of the 
American public approved of US usage of lethal drone strikes to target terrorists in 
foreign countries while only 35% disapproved, which indicates a relatively high level of 
support for a single issue (Pew Research Center, 2015). Moreover, although Republicans 
are often found to be more likely to approve of missile strikes from drones than 
Democrats, the issue also possesses a high level of bipartisan support. This situation thus 
appears quite odd—in a political system in which fissures in American public support are 
the norm, why are so many Americans supportive of lethal drone strikes? An interesting 
wrinkle also emerges in the results of a 2017 Pew Research Center survey, which reveals 
that about 48% of Americans say that the use of military force against countries that may 
threaten the US, but have not yet attacked, can rarely or never be justified (Pew Research 
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Center, 2017). This appears to clash with the use of lethal drone strikes, which often 
involves preemptive attacks on countries with which the US is not involved in any direct 
military confrontation such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. In an attempt to resolve 
this discrepancy, the question thus becomes, what are the individual-level factors that 
affect American public support for lethal drone strikes? Moreover, which of those factors 
shape Americans’ views about lethal drone strikes most strongly?  
The use of drones in warfare offers a particularly appealing allure because by 
substituting capital for labor, drones reduce the number of lives risked in combat, which 
minimizes the risk of soldier casualty to zero. When formulating their opinions regarding 
the use of military force, Americans often conduct an internal cost-benefit calculus. By 
eliminating the possibility of American soldier casualties from such a calculation, the 
benefits of a military operation can be achieved in a much safer and lower-cost way. This 
means that for many Americans, the US can pursue its national objectives without putting 
any American soldiers in harm’s way. Thus, casualty aversion appears to form the 
foundation for American approval of lethal drones strikes. However, lethal drone strikes 
possess negative consequences as well, some of which the American public may be 
unaware. Thus, upon being presented with potential drawbacks of drones, one will be 
able to assess which of these negative consequences undermines support for lethal drone 
strikes most strongly. Since such unmanned airstrikes could revolutionize the nature of 
warfare, it is critical to gain a deeper understanding of which factors exert the greatest 
impact on American public approval. Moreover, a closer analysis of individual-level 
factors can help to assess the durability of American public support for lethal drone 
strikes. That is, is public approval of drones so high because the American public lacks 
all the requisite information about potential drawbacks to make a fully informed 
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judgment, or are drones a compelling enough form of military technology that Americans 
are willing to approve of their usage, regardless of the consequences?   
Accordingly, a main objective of this project is to identify which factors most 
strongly influence American public support for lethal drone strikes used to target 
terrorists in foreign countries. That is, when respondents are presented with different 
consequences of lethal drone strikes, which factor will be most effective in altering levels 
of public support? The findings of this study also attempt to fill a gap in the existing 
literature surrounding lethal drone strikes. Much of the existing literature tends to focus 
on drones’ technological capabilities, current trends in drone proliferation, and debates 
over whether drones should be considered a transformative technology worthy of being 
incorporated as the central feature of US military strategy. Although many scholars have 
investigated the negative drawbacks of lethal drone strikes, few pieces of existing 
scholarship explore the connection between different consequences of drone warfare and 
public approval. Also, in order to determine whether drones are a unique military 
weaponry development that could fundamentally change the relationship between public 
opinion and the use of military force, this project seeks to compare American public 
support for unmanned airstrikes by drones and manned airstrikes.  
This study employs a survey experiment designed to assess which factor, either 
positive or negative, yields the greatest impact on Americans’ approval of lethal drone 
strikes. Respondents are recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and they are 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions—Militarily Effective, 
Militarily Ineffective, International Law, and Increased Ease of Military Intervention. All 
of the conditions present respondents with the same hypothetical scenario in which the 
United States discovers a group of extremists operating in a small village in Pakistan; 
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this group is suspected to possess plans to attack the US. Accordingly, the US is planning 
to launch lethal drone strikes to eliminate these extremists. In addition to this general 
prompt, each experimental condition contains a treatment wherein respondents receive a 
statement highlighting either a benefit or drawback of lethal drone strikes. In the 
Militarily Effective condition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff claims that the strikes have been 
critical in eliminating extremists and making Americans safer. The Militarily Ineffective 
condition utilizes the authority of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human 
Rights and Counterterrorism to claim that lethal drone strikes trigger anti-US sentiment, 
which allows extremist groups to recruit new members. Consequently, the Militarily 
Ineffective condition states that drone strikes may actually make Americans less safe. In 
the International Law condition, the same organizations from the Militarily Ineffective 
condition indicate that lethal drone strikes violate international law in two ways. First, 
drone strikes violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state in which the 
attack takes place. Second, these organizations argue that drone strikes fail to take 
necessary measures to prevent civilian casualties. The Increased Ease of Military 
Intervention condition highlights the argument that the ability to conduct strikes without 
risk to American lives lowers the threshold for authorizing lethal military operations, 
which could increase the frequency of American military intervention worldwide. Also, 
since drone strikes can be executed with the push of a button, they could make it too easy 
to kill human beings.   
The results of this study show that the International Law condition yields the 
greatest negative impact on American public approval of lethal drone strikes. Although 
none of the experimental conditions produce statistically significant results, 
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international law concerns most strongly influence respondents to become less approving 
of lethal drone strikes. This finding is consistent with previous research demonstrating 
the resonance of international law concerns with the American public (Kreps and 
Wallace, 2016). Interestingly, both the Militarily Ineffective and Increased Ease of 
Military Intervention conditions increase the likelihood of approval, albeit very slightly. 
An increase in approval under the Militarily Ineffective condition could be due to 
patriotic distrust of intergovernmental organizations, which could be shaped by the 
current Trump administration. Also, the results show that partisan identification as a 
Republican, Hispanic/Latino origin, prior service in the armed forces, and having a 
relationship with someone who has served in the armed forces are the most significant 
predictors of increased approval of lethal drone strikes. Conversely, females are 
significantly less likely to approve of lethal drone strikes, which mirrors findings from 
previous studies investigating the relationship between gender and support for military 
force more generally. Neither age nor level of education is a significant indicator of 
approval.  
The results of this project will not only be relevant for understanding which 
factors impact public support for drone strikes most strongly, but also for investigating 
future trends in American public opinion regarding the use of military force, especially 
when implemented via increasingly autonomous weaponry systems. First, this work 
inspires future research into the continued relevance of just war theory on public attitudes 
regarding the use of military force. That is, as means of warfare create more distance 
between the combatant and the battlefield, future studies could investigate whether 
fighting and killing with “honor” are still major concerns for the American public. With 
the advent of such technology, do Americans still care about fighting in a “just” way? 
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Moreover, these ethical concerns can be further expanded with the study of public 
opinion regarding autonomous weapons systems such as killer robots. Autonomous 
weapons systems not only widen the gap between the combatant and the battlefield, but 
they also possess the potential to remove the human factor in decision-making altogether. 
Although completely autonomous systems do not yet exist, future research can examine 
whether the public’s desire for the elimination of American casualties will result in a 
willingness to support a form of technology in which humans no longer conduct or 
oversee the mission. Such an inquiry could produce findings relevant to both academic 
literature and the future direction of public policy. Furthermore, researchers can study 
whether these findings apply to other countries or if the results of this cost-benefit 
calculus represent a uniquely American phenomenon.  
Finally, future research can investigate how the Trump administration has 
affected the impact of international law concerns on public attitudes regarding warfare. 
President Trump’s “America First” rhetoric, which often criticizes the value of 
multilateral agreements, appears to signal his disdain for the supposed “interference” of 
international organizations in American affairs. Thus, his critiques of the United Nations, 
which functions as the primary body for the creation and dissemination of international 
law norms, could damage American public opinion regarding the UN’s legitimacy and 
authority. Future work can thus investigate whether the adoption of such beliefs will 
reduce the impact of international law concerns on public attitudes regarding use of 
military force. Will other factors become more influential in the public’s approval of 
military technology such as lethal drone strikes?  
More broadly, as military technology begins to rely less on direct military 
intervention achieved through “boots on the ground,” one must consider what the 
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implications of this shift will be for democratic decision-making. Since lethal drone 
strikes do not require a formal declaration of war, which is debated in Congress, will 
American military decision-making become even less transparent? If so, could this render 
the influence of American public opinion on the direction of foreign policy increasingly 
irrelevant? Overall, this study provides a starting point for future research not only on 
public attitudes regarding drones but also the potentially broader consequences of the rise 
of new forms of military technology.   	
Background and Related Scholarship 
Part I. Existing Literature on Drones 
What is a drone?  
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as drones, are aerial 
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator. Drones can be 
categorized according to their intended usage and level of technological capability. First, 
UAVs can be either armed or unarmed. Whereas unarmed drones can only be used for 
surveillance missions, armed drones can carry out lethal missions as well as conduct 
surveillance (Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2017). Second, there are two basic types of 
drones—advanced and basic. Advanced drones possess significant loitering capabilities 
in which they can stay in the air for at least 20 hours, operate at an altitude of at least 
16,000 feet, and withstand a maximum takeoff weight of at least 1,320 pounds. UAVs 
with a higher technological capacity can be characterized by more advanced mission 
equipment such as gyro-stabilized high-power telescopes, laser designators, synthetic 
aperture radars, and precision munitions. Since requirements for target recognition and 
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successful attacks demand high levels of capital for development, typically only wealthy 
and technologically advanced countries such as the US and Israel can manufacture such 
advanced systems. Examples of advanced drones include the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 
Reaper, and RQ-7 Shadow, which are commonly deployed by the US. Basic drones, on 
the other hand, offer a shorter range and typically contain less sophisticated technology. 
Some lower technology systems such as the Iranian Ababil use basic radio remote control 
to allow unmanned flight and video recording, yet such aircraft are highly susceptible to 
being shot down, jamming, or interception. Additionally, shorter-range systems, often 
only capable of flight for up to 300 kilometers, are commonly used for loitering and 
operating autonomously in enemy territory, which is described as “swarming use” (Davis 
et al., 2014).  This study will focus on advanced, armed drones used to carry out precision 
strikes.  
Although armed drones are a more recent phenomenon, unarmed drones have 
been utilized for surveillance since the 1960s, emerging out of a growing desire to 
overcome the vulnerability of piloted aircraft. For example, the US deployed Firebee 
UAVs to conduct surveillance during the Vietnam War and later relied upon unarmed 
Predators for surveillance in the 1990s Balkans war (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 
2016). Armed drone strikes began to emerge as a means for conducting precision strikes 
against high-value targets in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks (Fuhrmann 
and Horowitz, 2017). Whereas the US commonly utilizes the Reaper and Predator, both 
of which are armed and capable of flying long distances at medium altitudes to conduct a 
strike, the majority of other countries’ militaries possess unarmed drones, which are used 
for surveillance purposes. Almost ninety countries possess military drones of some kind, 
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yet the majority does not possess armed and advanced drones (Horowitz, Kreps, and 
Fuhrmann, 2016).  
 
Drone proliferation 
 
Despite their capital-intensive nature, drone programs have begun to spread 
internationally as more countries strive to develop their own armed drone fleets. As to be 
expected from the world’s foremost military power, US UAV procurement and R&D 
accounted for more than 50% of the total amount spent worldwide on military UAV 
procurement and R&D in 2014 (Davis et al., 2014). In 2013, the US was estimated to 
possess about 7,500 drones in operation, including a wide range of both smaller, 
surveillance-based drones as well as larger, lethal drones used for targeted killings. By 
comparison, China, which is considered the world’s second largest producer of drones, 
trailed behind the US by at least several thousand drones (Boyle, 2014). However, a 2014 
study by the RAND Corporation projects US spending on drones to remain relatively 
constant over time and to not increase significantly from 2018 to 2022; this projection 
remains subject to change depending on policies set by presidential administrations. Also, 
despite its current preeminence in amount of drones, technological range, and strike 
capacity, the US is no longer the world’s leading exporter of drones. Instead, Israel has 
become the dominant exporter of drones for both domestic and military uses (Boyle, 
2014). Thus, although the US has been the leading actor in the field of drones so far, the 
proliferation of drone technology throughout the international system portends America’s 
waning comparative advantage.  
Looking beyond the US, the development and use of drones has exploded in 
recent years. For example, between 2004 and 2011, the number of states with active 
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UAV programs doubled, from 40 states to over 80 (Boyle, 2014). By the end of 2014, 
twenty-seven countries possessed advanced drones, seven countries possessed armed 
drones, and almost twenty-four other countries were reported to have plans for 
developing lethal UAV capability (Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2017). Also, there has been 
a gradual increase in spending on UAV procurement and R&D by the rest of the world. A 
RAND study in 2014 found that China, India, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United 
Arab Emirates were reportedly developing Category I systems, which encompass 
medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs designed for surveillance, target acquisition, 
reconnaissance, and attack. Moreover, the same study determined that Israel, Pakistan, 
and South Africa sought to develop Category II systems, which possess a similar range to 
Category I yet carry a lighter payload (Davis et al., 2014).  
Beyond just building up their own drone arsenals to be used for security, countries 
such as China and Russia have dedicated themselves to catching up to the US in research 
and development for drone technology. In particular, China wishes to become the world’s 
predominant exporter in the drone market. Over the past few years, China has sought to 
establish itself as an alternative manufacturer of armed drones, producing UAVs such as 
the CH-3 and Wing Loong. Currently, Chinese drones lack the same navigational 
capabilities, weaponry payload, and range as US drones, but the Chinese UAV program 
continues to actively improve (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016). The Chinese 
development of a widespread, sophisticated drone program raises potential concerns for 
the fate of the international system. US exports of drones are currently constrained by 
American involvement in the Missile Technology Control Regime, which limits the sale 
and export of heavy payload weapons, and the Wassenaar Agreement, which requires 
participants to disclose information about their deliveries. As a result, despite its 
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leading role in technological capacity and R&D, the US does not actually sell that many 
drones on the international market, and when it does, most of these weapons are sold to 
NATO allies (Boyle, 2014). In comparison, China possesses no such restrictions on drone 
sales, enabling it to sell weaponry to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria, 
which are countries to which the US has refused to export (Boyle, 2014). Thus, by 
potentially selling to erratic countries and non-state actors, China’s role as a rising 
exporter in drone sales could lead to an increase in tension and violent conflicts 
worldwide. An example of this can already be observed in 2015 when China supplied 
Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan with armed drones, which were employed against domestic 
insurgents (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016). Unfortunately, the sale of lethal 
drones to a broader range of countries represents only one of many concerns about drone 
proliferation.  
In his 2014 article, “The Race for Drones,” Michael Boyle presents three primary 
consequences of drone proliferation within the international system. As a premise for his 
argument, Boyle suggests that states developing drones will likely not use them in the 
same manner as the US, that is, as a means of targeted killing of suspected terrorists. 
Rather, these countries will most likely use drones in order to gain an advantage in their 
regional rivalries (Boyle, 2014). Building upon this supposition, Boyle first posits that 
drone proliferation will result in a redefinition of the rules and norms governing 
surveillance and reconnaissance. Although this could be beneficial in the short-term by 
improving the flow of information between countries and reducing the risk of 
miscalculation, Boyle argues that in the long-term, such an improved flow of information 
could be lead to the development of more aggressive and riskier countermeasures to stop 
drone surveillance. That is, in order to ensure the secrecy of their activities, states 
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being targeted by drones could utilize more aggressive means of protection such as 
shooting down drones in their airspace. Moreover, despite an initial increase in 
transparency, drone proliferation could ultimately lead to greater opaqueness as states 
implement radar systems to block surveillance, which would lead to greater information 
asymmetry and uncertainty. Second, since they are a low-cost and low-risk form of 
technology, Boyle claims that governments will use drones to test the strategic 
commitment of their rivals, which could undermine the deterrence inherent in many tense 
regional relationships. An example of this phenomenon can be observed in 2013 when 
China deployed drones over the contested Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea as a 
means of testing Japan’s commitment to controlling the territory. When Japan threatened 
to shoot the drones down, China stated that such an action would denote an act of war, 
which ratcheted up the preexisting level of tension in their relationship. Since drones do 
not possess the potential for loss of a human pilot, many governments might regard the 
shoot down of a drone as a negligible loss, yet such a response could lead to the rapid 
escalation of conflict. Finally, Boyle also outlines the concern that drone proliferation 
could lead to an increased risk of conflict spirals stemming from accidents or hijacked 
drones. As drone usage becomes more diffuse throughout society, it becomes more 
difficult to control where drones fly and prevent them from colliding with civilian 
aircraft, which could result in casualties. In response to these consequences, Boyle 
suggests restricting the sale of sophisticated drones, banning certain countries involved in 
regional rivalries from purchasing drones, applying user-end agreements that regulate 
how drones are used once purchased, and pursuing US-led efforts to establish norms for 
the use and sale of drones abroad (Boyle, 2014).  
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Other scholars advance concerns about drone proliferation due to the dual-use 
nature of drone technology, which could raise significant regulatory challenges. Drones 
are considered a form of dual-use technology because they can be utilized in both 
military and civilian settings. Unlike Boyle and other scholars who assume that drone-
related problems could be managed if there were broader state-level agreement 
surrounding the enactment of regulations, Marcus Schulzke argues for the acceptance of 
drones as an immovable feature of war, the negative effects of which should be contained 
(Schulzke, 2018). He claims that drones are often difficult to regulate because they are 
dual-use in a more expansive sense than other technologies, the drone market is open to a 
more diverse array of actors, which makes the restriction of usage more difficult, and 
greater familiarity with drones in civilian life increases citizens’ support for armed drones 
(Schulzke, 2018). This final item raises an interesting point—in today’s society wherein 
average citizens interact with drones much more frequently, this familiarity can translate 
to higher levels of trust and confidence in the technology. Consequently, higher levels of 
trust can lead to greater support for arming drones (Schulzke, 2018).  In light of these 
concerns, Schulzke advocates for an alternative solution to the consequences of drone 
proliferation wherein restrictions should seek to moderate the pace of development rather 
than attempting to stop it entirely or impose an overly elaborate system of regulatory 
mechanisms.  
 
Drones: transformative technology or nothing too special?  
Amidst weighing the benefits of drone warfare with concerns about potential 
drawbacks, a central question has risen to prominence in the existing literature on 
drones—should drones be considered a transformative technology or are drones just 
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another option in a country’s array of military capabilities? For some analysts, drones 
represent a “revolutionary military technology” capable of fundamentally altering the use 
of violence by both state and non-state actors. The driving force behind such an argument 
is that drones lower the costs of using military force. According to Horowitz, Kreps, and 
Fuhrmann, “drones change decision-making because they do not inherently risk the life 
and limb of the user” (2016). Thus, for many scholars, drones represent a breakthrough in 
military weaponry by providing military leaders and policymakers with a low-cost, low-
risk technological option.  
Furthermore, drones can be considered transformative technology due to their 
enhanced capability for coercion. Although scholars such as Schelling would claim that 
credible threats rely upon the conveyance of costly signals, others argue that drones offer 
threat credibility through cheap fighting rather than costly signaling (Zegart, 2018). 
Traditional political theory claims that signals are thought to be more credible and costly 
if they invoke blood (loss of human life), treasure (high financial costs), or reputation 
(high international or domestic costs). However, drones deviate from this usage by 
offering a low-cost, low-risk alternative. Drones offer three unexpected coercion 
advantages—first, sustainability in long duration conflicts; second, certainty of precision 
punishment, which can change the psychology of the adversary; and third, shifts in the 
relative costs of war (Zegart, 2018). Zegart emphasizes the importance of the first and 
third factors. She argues that threats from a drone state are more likely to be carried out 
due to the possibility of sustaining a drone presence. That is, the ever-present nature of 
drones can exert a sense of pressure on the target state. Also, in a situation wherein the 
coercing state possesses armed drones but the targeted state does not, drones radically 
shift the balance of the costs of war. Drones enable the coercer to engage in military 
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action at a low cost, yet the targeted state will suffer disproportionately high costs. As 
such, drones can be used as a tool to compel submission. Zegart argues that in some 
coercion situations, drones are perceived to be as coercive as ground troops, yet they do 
not incur any of the danger to human lives (Zegart, 2018). Thus, as a result of their low-
cost and low-risk nature, drones can represent a transformative military technology.     
A drawback of this transformative technology is that by not placing American 
lives in danger, drones do not draw the same public criticism as more traditional troop 
deployments. Consequently, government decision-makers face a lower barrier to the use 
of force, which some believe will lead to a heightened willingness to order military 
strikes. Those who hold this perspective point to the frequency of US drone strikes in 
countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, arguing that instances of military force 
would be more infrequent if not for drones. Accordingly, some analysts worry that drones 
will destabilize the global security system by freeing decision-makers from the 
limitations imposed by human casualties, thus lowering the threshold for use of lethal 
military force (Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016).  
Conversely, many scholars believe that drones merely represent the newest 
development in military technology, yet they do not offer a unique advantage over 
preexisting forms of military force. According to some, drones should not be considered 
a transformative military technology because although drones provide militaries with 
another delivery system for targeted killings, similar effects can be achieved through 
other forms of military force such as ground troops or manned aircraft (Horowitz, Kreps, 
and Fuhrmann, 2016). Furthermore, others base their argument upon the presumption that 
a revolutionary weapon, if present on one side of a conflict, should decisively tip the odds 
of winning towards the party possessing the technology (Davis et al., 2014). Given 
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that such findings have not yet been observed in reality, many are skeptical of the so-
called transformative nature of drones.  
 
Public knowledge about drones 
 Unlike certain issues in American foreign policy, drones often do not dominate 
the nation’s headlines, and as a result, the American public tends to be ill-informed about 
drones. A 2016 study by the Center for a New American Security highlighted this fact by 
demonstrating how the American public possesses a low level of knowledge about 
drones. First, based upon data collected from respondents, the US public struggles with 
distinguishing between manned and unmanned aircraft. 54% of respondents were unable 
to identify the MQ-1 Predator correctly while 66% were unable to identify the MQ-9 
Reaper as an armed, unmanned aircraft. However, this inability to identify military 
apparatus extended beyond just different types of drones, which can be seen in the 
finding that 21% of respondents incorrectly identified the manned F-16 fighter as an 
unmanned aircraft. Second, Americans demonstrate a lack of knowledge regarding the 
weaponry apparatus with which drones are equipped. 32% of respondents believed that 
UAVs used guns, which they do not, and 31% believed that unmanned aircraft were 
capable of carrying 1000-pound bombs, yet in reality, they can only carry 500-pound 
bombs at a maximum. Broadly, the American people tend to believe that UAVs are more 
accurate and more likely to survive battlefield encounters than manned aircraft, both of 
which are untrue. Moreover, they believe that drones are more likely to launch airstrikes 
and are less constrained by rules of engagement. Despite their lack of substantive 
knowledge about drone capabilities, the public favored unmanned aircraft over manned 
airstrikes in all but two experimental scenarios. The two exceptions included a scenario 
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involving high risk to civilians, which prompted respondents to prefer manned over 
unmanned strikes, and a scenario with low risk to air crew, in which respondents did not 
display a clear preference between manned and unmanned platforms (Schneider and 
Macdonald, 2016). Based on these findings, one may conclude that on the whole, the 
American public is not highly knowledgeable about drones.  
 Despite possessing a low level of knowledge about drones, the American public’s 
support still acts as the foundation for policy. In light of the high levels of approval for 
lethal drone strikes among average American citizens, some scholars question whether 
the assumptions embedded in polls can affect attitudes (Kinder and Sanders, 1990). In her 
2014 study, Kreps argues that with regard to drones, public opinion polls often present a 
viewpoint consistent with the government’s position, which glosses over controversial 
features that might prompt higher levels of opposition and lower levels of support (Kreps, 
2014). She suggests that this effect does not stem from wording effects, but rather, 
surveys often appropriate a viewpoint that increases the likelihood that a larger 
proportion of the public will approve. Her study revealed that by incorporating 
questionable assumptions and omitting the most controversial aspects of drones, polls 
strongly influence support for the US drone program (Kreps, 2014). First, polls often 
frame drone strikes as targeting high-level terrorists, which neglects questions about 
whether the targets are actually terrorists and the amount of civilian collateral damage. 
Second, polls fail to include discussion of legal authorization for such strikes. Operating 
under the assumption that drone strikes are legally authorized and target the correct 
subjects, the public becomes more inclined to approve of US drone policy, which can be 
observed in consistently high levels of support across three years of polling data (Kreps, 
2014). Consequently, the approval from polls becomes incorporated into the political 
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narrative surrounding drones, which further normalizes their usage. In light of these 
findings, public opinion polls can compound the public’s lack of knowledge about drones 
to produce a high level of approval for the US drone program.  
 
 
Part II. Public Attitudes about the Use of Military Force 
 Despite the fact that Americans lack a substantial level of political knowledge 
pertaining to a wide variety of issues and often do not appear to possess a consistent set 
of political attitudes, some scholars still argue that Americans hold organized, reliable, 
and important attitudes about the use of military force. The institutional structure of the 
US empowers the American electorate to punish their representatives at the ballot box for 
a range of issues, particularly military activities overseas. Hurwitz and Peffley argue that 
the American people impose limits on policymakers in the field of foreign policy because 
military issues “are inherently more threatening to the public, are more often the object of 
media coverage, and are generally more salient in the people’s mind,” and as a result, 
“the public is more likely to think seriously about issues like military involvement” 
(Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Consequently, policymakers consider public support as a 
vital factor when deciding to implement military force internationally. As this 
phenomenon has continued throughout the years and across a variety of different 
situations, a recurrent question has puzzled political scientists—what factors shape public 
attitudes about the use of military force? The following section will address the main 
hypotheses seeking to answer this question.  
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Casualties  
Much of the scholarly literature centers on the role of casualties in public attitudes 
towards the use of military force. Conventional thinking suggests that Americans are 
unsupportive of military operations that produce casualties. This phenomenon, typically 
referred to as “casualty phobia,” occurs when those in the public reflexively lower their 
level of support in response to the presence of casualties. The shock and horror of 
casualties trigger an automatic, visceral reaction within the American public, which leads 
them to call for the immediate removal of troops. In order to illustrate this point, some 
scholars point to examples such as the decline in public support for American military 
involvement in the Vietnam War or American withdrawal from Somalia after the “Black 
Hawk Down” Army Ranger raid in October 1993 (Feaver and Gelpi, 2009). Although 
casualties do possess the potential to influence the level of public support, many scholars 
have argued that the American public is much more tolerant of casualties than previously 
thought (Feaver and Gelpi, 2009). However, under the broad umbrella of this conclusion, 
scholars differ in their explanations.  
In the 1970s, John Mueller sought to understand the manner in which casualties 
undermined the American public’s support for the Vietnam War, which led him to the 
conclusion that public support declined according to a logarithmic model. That is, the 
public was sensitive to small costs of human life in the beginning, but was only affected 
by much larger losses later in the war (Mueller, 1971). Although his findings argued that 
public support declined reflexively, Mueller’s work disputed the casualty phobia thesis in 
part by showing that public support for a military operation didn’t dramatically drop as 
the amount of casualties increased. However, over time, the scholarly consensus began to 
dispute this model of inexorable decline of support and instead argued that the public 
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conducts a rational cost-benefit calculus. This perspective espouses that the American 
people assess all of the relevant factors at play and determine whether the benefits 
outweigh the costs of the military mission in question. Operating under this assumption, 
scholars diverge yet again when attempting to determine which factor is most important 
in determining one’s level of public support.  
Bruce Jentleson argues that the casualty tolerance of a “pretty prudent public” is 
largely influenced by the “principal policy objective” of the military operation (Jentleson, 
1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998). Principal policy objectives (PPOs) include foreign 
policy restraint, which involves the use of military force to apply pressure on an 
aggressive adversary that threatens the US and its interests, humanitarian intervention, 
and internal political change within a country. Jentleson found that the American public 
possesses a hierarchical structure of tolerance with regard to each of these PPOs. The 
public regards foreign policy restraint as very important and deserving of a more serious 
price whereas support for humanitarian intervention and internal political change hinge 
upon a low threshold for cost. That is, Americans are the most tolerant of casualties when 
the military operation is designed to achieve foreign policy restraint (Jentleson, 1992).  
In a similar vein, Héctor Perla argues that public support for military engagements 
depends on the public’s decision-making reference point, which is determined by what 
the public perceives the policy’s objective to be (Perla, 2011). He suggests a Framing 
Theory of Policy Objectives in which public support for military engagements will 
increase when the public perceives the mission’s principal objective as seeking to 
confront external threat but will decrease if the objective is viewed as seeking gains 
(Perla, 2011). Consequently, framing imposed by media coverage plays a critical role in 
influencing public support. For example, when the media frames the objective of 
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military force as seeking to protect the public from potential threats, the American public 
is more likely to back riskier, costlier, and more hawkish policies.  
Similarly to Jentleson, Feaver and Gelpi assume that the American public is 
relatively rational and prudent when conducting a cost-benefit calculus about a military 
operation. However, Feaver and Gelpi argue that two main factors interact to influence 
casualty tolerance: expectation of the probability of success of the military operation and 
belief in the initial legitimacy of the decision to engage in military action (Feaver and 
Gelpi, 2009). That is, “the more likely you think the operation will be a success and the 
more correct you think the original decision was, the more you will be willing to pay a 
higher cost in the form of mounting combat fatalities” (Feaver and Gelpi, 2009: 20). 
Although both elements are required to yield a significant effect on casualty tolerance, 
expectation of success is argued to be the more important of the two factors.  
 
Elite cues  
 Typically forced to form their attitudes without access to all of the relevant data 
about the use of military force, US citizens often turn to cues from political and military 
elite. In his 1992 book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, John Zaller 
hypothesized that the public tends to hold the same views as their political leaders when 
the elite are united about what should be done. However, as fissures start to appear 
among the elite, the public soon divides as well, aligning with the ideological or partisan 
position of their preferred elite (Zaller, 1992). When Eric Larson tested this hypothesis 
with regard to the American public’s attitudes about US military involvement in a wide 
range of conflicts, his findings confirmed Zaller’s thesis. His 1996 study showed that 
support for US military operations and the public’s willingness to tolerate casualties 
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were based upon a rational cost-benefit calculation, which was heavily influenced by 
consensus among political leaders (Larson, 1996). That is, when political leaders agreed 
that the objectives of a military operation warranted the costs and benefits associated with 
it, the public became more likely to support the operation. However, this effect did 
depend on whether the public found those opinion leaders to be credible and trustworthy. 
Conversely, when leaders split along partisan or ideological lines, the public tended to 
divide in a similar manner. Larson’s findings also foreshadowed some of the findings of 
Feaver and Gelpi wherein the higher the probability that the intervention would be 
successful, the higher the probability was that the intervention would be supported 
(Larson, 1996). Adam J. Berinsky’s 2007 study yielded similar findings, showing that if 
elite discourse remained unified in support of military intervention, citizens were more 
supportive of government policy, regardless of their political predispositions (Berinsky, 
2007). His results also demonstrated that in this context, perceptions of war casualties did 
not influence public attitudes toward war.  
 More recently, a 2018 study conducted by Golby, Feaver, and Dropp illustrated 
that under certain conditions, senior military officers often have the ability to nudge 
public attitudes about the use of military force. When told that senior military leaders 
opposed particular military interventions, the level of public opposition to that 
intervention increased. Interestingly, despite providing a small boost in public support, 
endorsements of support for a military operation impacted public attitudes less strongly 
than statements of disapproval. Moreover, partisanship appeared to play a critical role in 
shaping the conditions under which a respondent would respond to an elite military cue 
(Golby, Feaver, and Dropp, 2018). For example, Republicans were especially likely to 
adhere to senior military officers on the decision surrounding the use of force, 
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particularly force relating to terrorism and national defense. Although Democrats and 
Independents did listen to senior military officers when they opposed an intervention, the 
impact was less substantial than for Republicans.  
  
Multilateralism 
 Some scholars have investigated the role of multilateralism in influencing public 
support for a military operation. Steven Kull found that multilateral involvement in a 
military mission boosted public support due to the belief that the US would not have to 
shoulder the costs of intervention independently (Kull, Destler, and Ramsay, 1997; Kull 
and Destler, 1999; Kull and Ramsay, 2000; Kull et al., 2002, 2003). That is, the public 
was more resistant to the unilateral use of force, yet when intervention was framed as part 
of a United Nations operation, that operation gained a majority of support (Kull, 1995). 
The increased comfort of not having to “go it alone” likely set the public’s minds at ease 
about the military involvement. The effect resulting from the cooperation of other 
international actors could stem from a lightened economic burden as well as external 
confirmation of the operation’s legitimacy.  
 
Gender  
 Gender emerges as a key factor when investigating what underpins American 
attitudes toward the use of military force abroad. In the US, the rate of support for 
military actions is consistently higher for men than for women; however, the extent of the 
gender gap can depend to a large degree on situational context. Brooks and Valentino 
argued that the size of the gender gap depends on the stakes of the war, in particular 
whether the objective of the war was to promote a humanitarian agenda or protect 
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economic and strategic interests (Brooks and Valentino, 2011). They hypothesized that 
empathy and motherhood should moderate the relationship between gender, stakes of 
war, and support for going to war. Motherhood is believed to lower the likelihood of 
female support for war because women are saddened to see someone else’s children 
become the victims of military intervention. This heightened sense of empathy 
supposedly leads to an increased distaste for war. The results confirmed this hypothesis, 
showing that women were more likely to support a war when its purpose was to protect 
lives rather than serve economic or strategic objectives.  
Yuval Feinstein believed the gender gap to be episodic rather than consistent, yet 
she attributed this gap to an interaction between gender, partisanship, and ideological 
identification. However, her results demonstrated that the gender gap in support for 
military engagement was not only due to partisanship; that is, a difference between men 
and women does not occur simply because women are more likely to identify with the 
Democratic Party and Democrats are less likely to support military action (Feinstein, 
2017). By analyzing US involvement in the Gulf War, NATO’s campaign in Kosovo, and 
the Iraq War, she found that the gender gap fluctuated throughout the course of the 
military conflict. The divergence in support between men and women varied depending 
on specific military engagements or war events, which activated ideological dispositions 
differently. Using the Iraq War as an example, Feinstein’s results showed that differential 
ideological dispositions, primed by the war, led Democrats to oppose US involvement in 
the conflict. More specifically, an ideological disposition in question during the war on 
terror was the notion that the US should adopt a foreign policy that has international 
legitimacy. Throughout the course of the Iraq War, Democrats were more likely to 
possess concerns about the international standing of the US, which led to lowered 
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support for military action. Overall, Feinstein demonstrated that gender gaps could vary 
throughout the course of military involvement as wartime events activated certain 
ideological dispositions.  
Others have attempted to compare gender differences by asking the American 
public about their support for military action in hypothetical situations as well as 
concrete, real-life scenarios. Richard C. Eichenberg’s study found that on average, 
women were less supportive of the use of military force for any purpose. Interestingly, 
when responding to abstract, hypothetical military operations, the gender gap was 
practically nonexistent, yet upon being presented with specific questions about the use of 
force in Iraq and potential civilian and military casualties, a substantial difference 
between men and women began to emerge (Eichenberg, 2003). The results demonstrated 
that 70% of American men and almost 60% of women supported any military action 
against Iraq when the action in question was abstract. When casualties were mentioned in 
surveys, men continued to respond with majority support for the use of force in four of 
seven proposed episodes whereas women only showed majority support for two of seven 
episodes. Much like other studies have shown, women are relatively more sensitive to 
humanitarian concerns and casualties.  
Furthermore, while studying the gender gap relating to public attitudes about use 
of military force, some scholars have observed an interesting parallel with the gap in 
support between black and white Americans. Miroslav and Donna J. Nincic hypothesized 
that women and African Americans displayed lower levels of support for the use of 
military force abroad due to a higher degree of political alienation. As defined by Kevin 
Chen, political alienation refers to “estrangement or separation of an individual from 
particular political institutions, values, structures or regimes to which he belongs or is 
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related” (Chen, 1992: 42). Nincic operationalized this phenomenon by focusing on 
individuals’ self-reported levels of political efficacy, which can be measured by the 
amount of participation in the political process and perception of impact on political 
outcomes (Nincic and Nincic, 2002). Responses from two questions by the University of 
Michigan’s National Election Studies showed that black Americans experience a 
consistently higher level of political alienation than whites whereas the difference in men 
and women’s levels of political alienation is much smaller. Nincic’s model demonstrated 
that attitudes of African Americans and women appear to be rooted in traits particular to 
each group, although they did share some similar traits. That is, political alienation did 
partially unite women and African Americans with regard to their approval for military 
force abroad, yet it did not represent the entire basis for their preferences. Thus, social 
identity does play a role in shaping individuals’ attitudes toward US military involvement 
overseas, yet some aspects of this identity are rooted in structural features of US society 
while others can be understood as a consequence of the group’s previous historical 
experiences, such as the relation of the civil rights movement to the Vietnam War.  
 
Partisanship 
 Conventional wisdom states that Republicans and Democrats are hawks and 
doves, respectively, with regard to their stance on foreign policy, particularly the use of 
military force. Republican hawks are often more willing to support military interventions, 
oppose foreign aid and the UN, and support higher levels of military spending. 
Conversely, dovish Democrats are typically less willing to support military interventions, 
support foreign aid and the UN more strongly, and oppose high levels of military 
spending.  Although this phenomenon continues to hold true in the present day, 
 
31	
support for the use of military force has not always been aligned along the ideological 
spectrum in the way it is now. In fact, up until 1965, Democrats held hawkish positions 
while Republicans could be characterized as doves. Faced with the notion of such a 
radical transition in political ideology, various scholars have attempted to identify what 
factors prompted this change.  
 In the 1940s and 1950s, hawks were mostly Democrats who supported the use of 
military power to defeat fascism and promote collective security; conversely, 
Republicans tended to adopt dovish positions out of a desire for isolationism. Democrats 
tended to support military force because such hawkish policies could produce major 
benefits for their key constituencies, such as the Northeastern industries, which received a 
boost in business during the early postwar era (Clark, Fordham and Nordstrom, 2016). As 
for Republicans, they opposed military force due to the fiscal and regulatory 
consequences associated with high levels of military spending during the 1950s 
(Fordham, 2007; Hogan, 1998; Lo, 1982). High levels of military spending could impose 
price controls on raw materials, which hurt key Republican constituencies. However, 
beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing into the 1980s, the appeal of using military 
force declined for Democrats while it rose for Republicans. For Democrats, the benefits 
for Northeastern industries started to tail off, and during the 1980s, the Reagan 
administration’s military buildup imposed budgetary constraints on social programs 
supported by the Democratic Party (Clark, Fordham, and Nordstrom, 2016; Kamlet, 
Mowery, and Su, 1988). The Republicans’ support for the use of military force began to 
rise as the growth of the American economy by the mid-1960s ensured that military 
spending would not require the imposition of price controls on strategic raw materials 
(Clark, Fordham and Nordstrom, 2016). Furthermore, the Reagan administration’s 
 
32	
military buildup produced significant tax cuts, which pleased the Republicans. As a 
result, beginning in the mid-1960s, Republicans and Democrats began to shift in their 
foreign policy positions, ultimately adopting the previous stance of their opposing party.  
After this initial shift in position, Republican and Democratic stances on foreign 
policy began to drift farther apart beginning in the 1970s, which led to a steady increase 
in foreign policy polarization that has continued into the present. In fact, by the 2000s, 
foreign policy polarization gained the same severity as polarization regarding general 
political ideology. Jeong and Quirk (2019) describe three main factors that contributed to 
this rise in polarization of foreign policy. First, historical events such as the end of the 
Cold War and the occurrence of the Iraq War played a role in creating and enabling the 
spread of such polarization. The end of the Cold War removed a potential unifying 
interest between Republicans and Democrats—the desire to block Soviet expansionism 
(Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007; Prins and Marshall, 2001; Scott and Carter, 2002). 
Moreover, George W. Bush’s controversial invasion of Iraq, prompting the Iraq War, 
further divided the parties. Polarization surrounding issues such as these spilled over onto 
smaller, less significant issues while the overall level of polarization continued to ratchet 
up.  Second, although partisan electoral rivalry cannot explain the entire phenomenon, it 
can contribute to an explanation of the development of foreign policy polarization. Jeong 
and Quirk found that the narrower the margin of seats possessed by the majority party in 
the Senate, the more polarized foreign policy positions became. Third, and most 
importantly, domestic political polarization appeared to spill into foreign policy, causing 
foreign policy polarization to initially match, and subsequently surpass, the domestic 
ideological divide (Jeong and Quirk, 2019).  That is, senators tend to drift toward foreign 
policy positions that are consistent with their positions on domestic issues. Thus, 
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domestic conservatives are likely to become foreign policy hawks whereas domestic 
liberals are likely to hold dovish views. In light of these factors contributing to its 
existence, foreign policy polarization represents a key characteristic of American politics, 
particularly with regard to partisans’ support for the use of military force abroad. 
 
Part III. Primary Arguments For and Against Drones 
Military effectiveness  
 Strong supporters of drone warfare cite military effectiveness as a principal 
strength. Proponents claim that drones offer a no risk, low cost, and successful means for 
fighting terrorism. First, drones are argued to be a superior form of military force by 
eliminating risk to American soldiers. Second, armed UAVs are considered to be lower 
cost than other air systems due to less extensive training as well as removal of the need 
for search-and-rescue packages (Davis et al., 2014). Third, Byman argues that drones 
have proven to be successful in achieving US policy objectives, which is exemplified by 
the success of drones in damaging Al Qaeda and associated anti-American terrorist 
groups. According to his research, US drones have killed an estimated 3,300 Al Qaeda, 
Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen, including fifty senior 
leaders, since 2008 (Byman, 2013). Drones have not only eliminated key terrorist targets, 
he argues, but they have also disrupted terrorist operations by diminishing groups’ ability 
to communicate and train new recruits out of a need to avoid large group meetings lest 
they pose an easier target for drones. Such sentiments have been confirmed by the former 
director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, who said, “[t]hose operations are seriously disrupting 
al-Qaeda… It’s pretty clear from all the intelligence we are getting that they are having a 
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very difficult time putting together any kind of command control, that they are 
scrambling. And that we really do have them on the run” (Warrick and Finn, 2010).  
Other researchers echo such findings, particularly with regard to the success of 
lethal drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan. W. Andrew Terrill, a Middle East specialist 
at the Strategic Studies Institute, found that although drone strikes are highly unpopular 
with the local population in Yemen, such attacks have appeared to be successful at 
assisting the Yemeni government in their attempts to weaken Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) (Terrill, 2013). He points to the death of Anwar al Awlaki in 
September 2011 as a notable success. Despite being a citizen of the United States, Terrill 
argues that the elimination of al Awlaki was still beneficial since, according to President 
Obama, he was considered a higher priority for capture or elimination than Ayman al 
Zawahiri, who replaced bin Laden as the head of Al Qaeda Central (Terrill, 2013). 
Moreover, Terrill believes that drone strikes functioned as a vital tool in supporting 
Yemen’s offensive against AQAP insurgents in May and June 2012. Following a series 
of public demonstrations against President Saleh’s regime, AQAP insurgents had taken 
control of significant territory in many southern Yemeni towns and cities. When 
President Hadi sought to retake these areas with a dysfunctional army and air force, US 
drone strikes provided intelligence to combatant forces as well as eliminated key leaders 
and individuals among AQAP fighters who were preparing to ambush government forces. 
Ultimately, the Yemeni government recaptured the last AQAP-controlled areas in June 
2012, a fate likely made possible due to assistance provided by drone warfare. However, 
in light of such success, Terrill does acknowledge that, “drones, for all their value, cannot 
replace a legitimate government with a competent military in ensuring the national 
security of a strategically important country such as Yemen” (Terrill, 2013: 23). Thus, 
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the use of drone strikes can help to temporarily stabilize terrorist threats in foreign 
countries, yet the ability to relapse into instability suggests that drone strikes cannot 
permanently erase threats to US security.  
Furthermore, a case study by Javier Jordan sought to investigate the effectiveness 
of the drone campaign against Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, and his findings suggest that 
drones successfully damage the terrorist organization’s functioning by attacking its three 
key strengths. Jordan identifies Al Qaeda Central’s hierarchical structure, qualified 
human resources, and material resources as critical factors that enable the group to carry 
out destruction. He argues that drone strikes negatively affect the interaction between 
these factors, which diminishes the capacity of the terrorist organization to carry out 
highly lethal attacks. Data from the New America Foundation shows that a total of 
between 340 and 357 drone attacks occurred in the tribal territories of Pakistan between 
June 19, 2004 and May 31, 2013. These strikes consisted of a mix of high-value 
targeting, which attacks known leaders of terrorist groups, and signature strikes, which 
target unknown individuals whose pattern of behavior suggests potential terrorist activity. 
By the end of May 2013, the total number of deaths caused by drone strikes was between 
2,010 and 3,336. However, problematically, a study by the New America Foundation 
showed that between 54 and 61 percent of fatalities during 2004-2007 were civilians.  
First, Jordan argues that drone strikes impede the smooth functioning of the 
organization by targeting terrorist leaders, which force them to focus more on their self-
protection rather than running the group’s operations. This fear of discovery disrupts 
communication between different branches of the organization, which can be seen in the 
fact that Al Qaeda Central did not publicly announce the appointment of Ayman al 
Zawahiri as its leader following the death of Osama Bin Laden for a month and a half. 
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Jordan comments that this delay seems odd considering that the shift to a new 
commander in chief should have been a swift decision that would be quickly broadcast. A 
diminished ability to communicate within the terrorist network reduces the possibility of 
coordinating a complex attack. Moreover, reduced communications lessen the amount of 
possible recruitment for fear that such activities could attract an attack. As such, Jordan 
argues that the CIA drone campaign has forced Al Qaeda Central to switch to a more 
decentralized organizational structure in which leaders have little operational capacity. 
Second, Jordan claims that drone strikes have negatively impacted qualified human 
resources by killing approximately 60 leaders and middle-ranking members of Al Qaeda 
Central, which represents a large percentage of its elite members. Such deaths include 
members in roles such as chief executive of the organization, advisory council positions, 
military committee leadership, religious committee, financial committee, and propaganda 
wing. Jordan argues that based on the available information, Al Qaeda Central’s level of 
infrastructure is considerably less than it was before 9/11. Third, Jordan illuminates how 
drone strikes have impacted key material resources of Al Qaeda Central such as money, 
sanctuary, training camps, and weapons. According to Pakistani intelligence officials, the 
pressure from drone strikes diminished the flow of money to Al Qaeda officials by 
shutting down some transfer channels. Financial resources were also damaged due to the 
death of Mustafa Abu Al Yazid in May 2012, who was identified by the 9/11 
Commission Report as Al Qaeda Central’s main financial manager. Moreover, drone 
strikes eliminated some of the Al Qaeda sanctuary in North Waziristan, which required 
the group to move some of its members out of the region. Finally, a constant drone 
presence reduced the duration of training courses, which would likely trigger a signature 
strike. As a result of shortened training courses, operatives did not possess as much 
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knowledge regarding how to successfully execute certain tasks, such as detonation of a 
car bomb. An example of this can be seen in Faisal Shahzad’s failed attempt to detonate a 
car bomb in Times Square in May 2010. Prior to this attack, he had only received a 
training course lasting five days as opposed to the typical one-month of explosives 
training characteristic of Al Qaeda in its Afghanistan and early Pakistan years.  
Additionally, Jordan argues that drone strikes have reduced the lethality of Al 
Qaeda Central attacks in the West. Between 2001 and 2006, Al Qaeda carried out three 
successful terrorist operations—9/11, the Madrid train bombing, and the London 
bombings—which resulted in 3,220 fatalities. However, between 2007 and 2012, 13 
attempted attacks did not result in a single fatality. Despite some limitations of his 
findings such as insufficient information and difficulty of isolating the effect of drone 
strikes on Al Qaeda Central’s operation from other confounding variables, Jordan still 
affirms that drone strikes have proved militarily effective in diminishing the threat posed 
by terrorist groups (Jordan, 2014).   
 
Military ineffectiveness 
Conversely, in light of these tactical benefits, some doubt the military 
effectiveness of lethal drone strikes, which leads to the belief that drones should not be 
embraced as a critical strategy for American counterterrorism. In her article “Why 
Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Audrey Cronin comments that drones are not 
as militarily effective as they may seem. Since terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda do not 
operate solely under hierarchical leadership, targeting leaders does not fundamentally 
damage a terrorist organization (Cronin, 2013). Also, drones could potentially perpetuate 
the existence of terrorism by alienating local populations and cultivating a desire for 
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vengeance, which could lead to the creation of future terrorist recruits. Moreover, drones 
eliminate the possibility of arresting and interrogating targets. By killing rather than 
capturing terrorists, drones do not offer an opportunity to gain further intelligence about 
the terrorist organization, which could be a more effective strategy in broader 
counterterrorism efforts (Cronin, 2013).  
In adherence with a similar viewpoint, Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh 
conducted an empirical study to investigate the military effectiveness of lethal drone 
strikes. Based on the assumption that producing effective propaganda is an important 
objective of most terrorist groups, they selected Al Qaeda propaganda output as a proxy 
for Al Qaeda’s capacity to organize political action. As a result, they sought to evaluate 
the relationship between drone strikes and Al Qaeda propaganda output. Their results 
suggest that at best, drone strikes have little or no effect on Al Qaeda’s ability to create 
and distribute propaganda. In fact, their results show that drone strikes may be associated 
with higher, rather than lower, levels of propaganda output. These findings could mean 
that drone strikes have killed many terrorist militants associated with Al Qaeda, yet such 
deaths have not truly undermined the functional capacity of the organization (Smith and 
Walsh, 2013). Despite temporarily lowering the membership of the group, these drone 
strikes may be counterproductive to US security by fostering greater hatred towards 
America and inspiring further terrorist recruitment.    
 
International law concerns 
A key concern surrounding drone warfare stems from a fundamental tradeoff 
between security and international law. Opponents argue that lethal drone strikes tend to 
neglect two key components of just war theory: jus ad bellum—rules concerning the 
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resort to use of force—and jus in bello—rules governing wartime conduct. When 
considering jus ad bellum, many critics argue that since the United States is not at war 
with countries such as Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, drone strikes are illegal 
(O’Connell, 2011). Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for self-defense, which is 
triggered by a threat that is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and 
no moment of deliberation,” but this definition appears to clash with the rather 
deliberative and slow-moving nature of the target selection process for drones (Caroline 
Case, 1838). As such, the right to claim anticipatory self-defense as justification for drone 
strikes has not been widely accepted by the international community. Members of the 
Human Rights Council of the UN also note that the self-defense argument requires higher 
thresholds for necessity and proportionality, which the US has failed to demonstrate in its 
drone program (Alston, 2010). By contrast, Harold Hongju Koh, the legal adviser to the 
US Department of State under the Obama administration, has argued that a US drone 
strike authorized in the name of self-defense cannot be considered an unlawful 
assassination because “under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—
consistent with the applicable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level 
belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not 
unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination’” (Alston, 2010). In light of the 
controversy surrounding the Al-Awlaki case, in which an al-Qaeda-affiliated US citizen 
living in Yemen was killed by a drone strike without due process of law, the Obama 
administration established a set of parameters regarding permissibility of drone strikes. 
These parameters included the following:  
1. Suspects, such as Mr Al-Awlaki, can only be killed through drone attacks in the 
event that an incarceration of such person is illusory;   
2. The person in question has to be involved in preparing ‘acts of war’ against 
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the U.S.;   
3. Consequently, that individual should pose an immediate and significant threat to 
the U.S.;   
4. The State ‘hosting’ such an individual must not be able or willing to apprehend 
him or her (Savage, 2011).  
Many scholars worry that these rules hinge upon the definition of ambiguous concepts 
such as “acts of war” and “immediate and significant threat.”  
With regard to jus in bello, the Geneva Convention stipulates that parties involved 
in a conflict must be able to distinguish between a civilian and a combatant as well as 
take all possible precautions in both means and methods of attack to avoid or minimize 
damage to civilian life. However, since many terrorists wear normal clothes and integrate 
themselves within the civilian population, drone programs often struggle to differentiate 
between civilians and combatants. As a result, drones carry the implicit risk of inflicting 
civilian casualties. Moreover, the US often utilizes signature strikes to target terrorists, 
which sometimes fall short of the standard for distinction. A signature strike uses the 
patterns of behavior of a target to indicate that they intend to engage in combat against 
the US or local allies; as such, signature strikes usually target training camps and 
compounds suspected of containing enemy combatants (Boyle, 2013). Signature strikes 
typically rely upon the assumption that the person launching the strike is certain, within 
reason, that the activity witnessed is aiding the enemy (Boyle, 2013). Unfortunately, 
drone strikes do not always achieve this standard because the definition of “aiding an 
enemy” can vary drastically.  
Drone strikes have also been argued to constitute a violation of the distinction 
principle by subjecting civilians to constant anxiety and fear through a high frequency of 
attacks. Coyne and Hail argue that the use of drones to combat terrorism results in a 
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paradox because “drones, which are intended to kill terrorists, thereby reducing terrorism, 
create terror among the populace living in the targeted area” (Coyne and Hail, 2018). 
Although the creation of an atmosphere of terror can often be effective in disrupting the 
operations of targeted organizations, drone-created terror does not discriminate between 
civilians and enemy combatants. Instead, psychological damage is inflicted upon the 
entire neighborhood, which subjects everyone to the negative externalities of such a 
culture of fear, as seen in the following passage:  
“Imagine that you are living somewhere in Pakistan, Yemen, or Gaza where 
the United States and its allies suspect a terrorist presence. Day and night, 
you hear a constant buzzing in the sky. Like a lawnmower. You know that 
this flying robot is watching everything you do. You can always hear it. 
Sometimes, it fires missiles into your village. You are told the robot is 
targeting extremists, but its missiles have killed family, friends, and 
neighbors. So, your behavior changes: you stop going out, you stop 
congregating in public, and you likely start hating the country that controls 
the flying robot. And you probably start to sympathize a bit more with the 
people these robots, called drones, are monitoring” (Owen, 2013).  
As noted in the passage above, terrorist organizations can harness this drone-created 
terror as a recruitment tool, which could undermine the very purpose of drone strikes in 
the first place. Thus, although drone strikes are effective in eliminating targets, many 
worry that their unintended consequences might offset the benefits.  
 In lights of these concerns about violation of international law and the potential 
consequences of drone strikes, I advance the following hypothesis:  
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H1: International law concerns will yield the greatest negative impact on public 
approval of lethal drone strikes used to target terrorists in foreign countries.  
In their 2016 study, Kreps and Wallace found that highlighting inconsistencies between 
American usage of lethal drone strikes and principles of international law significantly 
altered public attitudes toward drone warfare (Kreps and Wallace, 2016). Their findings 
suggested that questions about legality influenced public attitudes more strongly than 
military effectiveness, and I expect similar results from this survey experiment. I expect 
most respondents to not have previously considered international legal concerns when 
formulating their opinions about drones, focusing instead on the removal of American 
casualties. However, when presented with such information about legal dilemmas 
surrounding drone warfare, I predict that respondents will display a lower level of 
approval.  
 Moreover, in addition to concerns about violation of international law, many 
criticize drone strikes for lacking an appropriate foundation in domestic legal authority. 
The primary basis for legal authorization of drone strikes is the Authorization to Use 
Military Force (AUMF) passed on September 14, 2001. The AUMF enables the president 
to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations, or persons” (Congress, 2001). The Bush and Obama administrations both 
relied upon an extensive interpretation of this law to pursue terrorists abroad, which 
includes the use of drone strikes. The Obama administration often cited the AUMF as 
justification for expanding the use of drone strikes in countries such as Pakistan, 
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Yemen, and Somalia by arguing that its “authority has no specified temporal or 
geographic limit” (Boyle, 2013). However, many scholars are concerned that the AUMF 
provides the US with a blank check to use military force anywhere in the world until 
terrorist organizations are completely eradicated.  
 
Increased ease of military intervention 
Although the elimination of American military casualties represents a key benefit 
of drones, many scholars worry that this capability will excessively lower the threshold 
for authorizing lethal military operations, thus facilitating a great number of strikes. 
Singer argues that “when politicians can avoid the political consequences of the 
condolence letter—and the impact that military casualties have on voters and on the news 
media—they no longer treat previously weighty matters of war and peace the same way” 
(Singer, 2012). That is, by removing military casualties from the decision-making 
calculus, drones reduce the need for extensive political debate, which could lead to a 
greater willingness and ease of deploying lethal military force. Such an increase in the 
ease of military intervention could destabilize the global security environment by creating 
the potential for more conflicts to emerge.  
Moreover, since the use of drones is not treated as a part of “war” in a formal 
sense, drone strike operations are typically not discussed in Congress. Instead, the CIA 
usually executes them clandestinely. According to Knoops, CIA methodology 
surrounding drone attacks remains obscure; such a lack of clarity can potentially give the 
CIA free reign to order killings as it sees fit (Knoops, 2012). Thus, some worry that drone 
warfare fundamentally challenges the decision-making process of a republican 
government, which, according to Kant, is less likely to go to war since a republican 
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government must remain accountable to its citizens. Kant asserts that justification for war 
stems from public deliberation and representative action, so after discussing the 
potentially disastrous consequences of war, communities will generally agree upon 
actions that generally promote peace (Kaag and Kreps, 2013). When drones are 
introduced in the equation, however, the consequences of war experienced most directly 
by American citizens vanish. Consequently, citizens will place less pressure on their 
representatives to prevent war, which means that the frequency of war could increase.  
Furthermore, in addition to diminished political and tactical thresholds for 
military interventions, potential ethical concerns arise from a lowered moral threshold to 
kill human beings. Some argue that as a result of the greater distance between operator 
and target, the use of drones can reduce the amount of contemplation regarding the 
decision to kill a target. It is argued that drone pilots may not fully comprehend the 
implications of their attacks because carrying out an attack from behind a control screen 
may produce a less visceral reaction than a more direct interaction such as battlefield 
engagement or a manned airstrike (Knoops, 2012). The ease of remotely pushing a button 
capable of killing someone could create the potential for a so-called “video game” 
mentality in which human targets are reduced to mere blips on a screen.  
Based on such concerns about the consequences of an increased ease of military 
intervention resulting from lethal drone usage, I predict the following:  
 H2: Increased ease of military intervention will yield a weaker negative impact on 
public approval of lethal drone strikes than international law concerns.  
I expect that increased ease of military intervention will result in a less significant impact 
on public approval of lethal drone warfare because I predict that respondents will struggle 
more with conceptualization of this potential consequence. The implications of a 
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lower threshold regarding the use of force may be a less tangible concept to comprehend 
in comparison with questions of international law, which leads to the expectation that 
increased ease of military intervention will yield a less significant impact on approval. 
 
Experimental Design  
 
In light of the existing concerns documented in the literature, I focused on four 
main factors—military effectiveness, military ineffectiveness, international law, and 
increased ease of military intervention—to determine which has the greatest impact on 
American public approval of lethal drone strikes. To test this, I conducted a survey with 
embedded experimental manipulations on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online 
service through which MTurk “Workers” are compensated for completion of surveys. 
MTurk offers researchers and companies a means to recruit individuals to accomplish 
tasks typically requiring human intelligence, such as the classification of pictures, 
transcription of handwriting or completion of surveys with embedded experimental 
manipulations (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). To get started, a researcher, the 
“Requester” as labeled on MTurk, creates an account, allocates funds to his or her 
account, and posts “job listings” describing the requirements of the Human Intelligence 
Task (HIT) and amount paid for completion. Workers’ payment can range from as low as 
$0.15 to as high as $0.75 per HIT. In order to ensure a higher quality sample, the 
Requester can restrict how many times a Worker may complete the task and set 
requirements for respondents including their country of residence, age, and prior approval 
ratings. A limitation of this project is that although Amazon Mechanical Turk offers a 
more representative sample than the undergraduate student body at the University of 
Pennsylvania, mTurk respondents are not representative of the entire American public.  
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That being said, many scholars continue to utilize this service because mTurk 
samples tend to fare better than other common convenience samples (Kreps and Wallace, 
2016). Also, past research studies have shown that studies using mTurk produce 
comparable treatment effects to studies utilizing more representative samples (Berinsky, 
Huber, and Lenz, 2012). Researchers often use two primary measures in order to assess 
the validity of the research conducted using MTurk—external and internal validity of the 
findings. In order to assess the external validity of MTurk findings, that is, whether the 
causal estimates from the research can be generalized to other settings and samples, 
Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz compared the characteristics of MTurk samples to those of 
other samples commonly used in political science research such as convenience samples, 
samples generated by high-quality Internet panels, and probability samples of US 
residents (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). To further address concerns about 
generalizability, they also used MTurk to replicate prior experiments. Their findings 
suggest that MTurk samples fare well in comparison to the characteristics of other 
research samples. For example, on many demographics such as gender and education, an 
MTurk sample was very similar to the unweighted data from American National Election 
2008-2009 Panel Study (ANESP); however, the MTurk sample underrepresented blacks 
and Hispanics as well as overrepresented younger and ideologically liberal citizens 
(Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). These results suggest that although the MTurk 
sample does not represent the US population, it certainly does not present a drastically 
distorted view of the American demographic makeup. Furthermore, the replication of 
three different experiments using an MTurk sample yielded highly similar results to those 
found in the published research, which suggests that MTurk can produce generalizable 
findings.  
 
47	
In order to assess the internal validity of MTurk findings, which determines 
whether the experiment’s causal estimates appropriately reflect the effects of the 
experimental manipulation, Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz investigated concerns about 
multiple completions of the survey and subject inattentiveness. They found that for a 
given survey, only 2.4% of the total responses came from the same IP address, yet this 
does not provide convincing evidence of a pattern of repeat survey takers. Even if these 
findings did reflect repeat survey takers rather than multiple people taking the survey 
from the same public location, the percentage is so low that only a small amount of 
responses would be contaminated (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). With regard to 
concerns about subject inattentiveness, Berinsky et al. found that when asked to recall a 
detail from a story previously read in the survey, 60% of MTurk respondents answered 
the question correctly. MTurk workers thus dramatically outperformed samples from 
Polimetrix/YouGov and Survey Sampling International, of which only 49% and 46%, 
respectively, correctly responded to an identical question. These findings suggest that 
subject inattentiveness should not represent a major concern about MTurk samples. 
Rather, due to their payment incentive, MTurk Workers might even be overly attentive, 
which could be problematic if a heightened level of attention to experimental stimuli 
enables respondents to determine the experimenter’s intent and behave accordingly 
(Orne, 1962; Sears, 1986). Overall, with the caveat that MTurk Workers tend to be 
younger and more ideologically liberal than the general American public, which could 
limit their suitability for some research topics, MTurk samples fare no worse than 
commonly used convenience samples (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012).     
I received funding from CURF, which was used to compensate respondents $0.50 
for their answers. The survey instrument consisted of presenting the participant with a 
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passage describing a hypothetical scenario about US usage of lethal drone strikes in a 
potentially threatening military conflict. The beginning of the passage in each treatment 
presented the same information about the scenario. Namely, the United States had 
discovered a group of extremists operating in Pakistan. This group of extremists was 
thought to possess plans to attack the United States. In response, the United States was 
planning to launch lethal drone strikes, and the passage described the basic functioning of 
a drone, including how drone strikes eliminate the possibility of American military 
casualties. The passages diverged across conditions by ultimately incorporating 
statements that related to one of the four factors relevant to the broader discussion of 
drones. The experimental conditions are as follows:  
 
 Militarily Effective:  
• Highlights the main strategic appeal of lethal drone strikes in that they 
possess the capability to kill suspected terrorists, which can make 
Americans safer.  
• Invokes the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who is 
the highest-ranking and most senior officer in the US Armed Forces.  
• Treatment: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that 
the strikes have been instrumental in killing suspected militants and 
making Americans safer.”  
Militarily Ineffective:  
• Highlights the notion that lethal drone strikes may undermine their 
intended purpose of making Americans safer by generating anti-American 
sentiment.  
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• Invokes the authority of prominent non-governmental and 
intergovernmental organizations dedicated to the protection of 
international law and human rights.  
• Treatment: “Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have 
indicated that the strikes trigger anti-US sentiment and help militants 
recruit new members, making Americans less safe.” 
International Law:  
• Highlights the concern that lethal drone strikes violate fundamental 
principles of international law.  
• Invokes the authority of prominent non-governmental and 
intergovernmental organizations dedicated to the protection of 
international law and human rights.  
• Treatment: “Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have 
indicated that the strikes violate international law in two ways. First, these 
organizations have indicated that these strikes violate international law 
because they break the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country 
where the attack takes place. Second, these organizations have indicated 
that these strikes also violate international law because they do not take 
necessary measures to prevent the death of civilians.” 
Increased Ease of Military Intervention:  
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• Highlights the concern that lethal drone strikes lower the threshold for 
conducting military operations overseas, which could lead to an increase 
in the frequency of military interventions and a decrease in the ethical 
obstacles to killing a human being.  
• Does not invoke a relevant authority figure or organization.  
• Treatment: “Scholars have indicated that the ability to conduct strikes 
without risk to American lives will lower the threshold for authorizing 
lethal military operations, which could increase the level of American 
military intervention worldwide. Also, since drone strikes can be executed 
with the push of a button, some scholars have indicated that drone strikes 
could make it too easy to kill human beings.”  
 
 After being presented with the stimulus, respondents were asked to rank their 
level of approval of the US conducting missile strikes from drones in that particular 
scenario on a scale of 1 to 5 wherein 1 indicated strong approval and 5 indicated strong 
disapproval. After numerically ranking their level of approval, respondents were asked to 
explain why they gave their response, which took the form of an open-ended question. 
Next, they were asked, “Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you 
approved initially or not. If given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or 
manned airstrikes to target extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?” 
Furthermore, respondents were asked to rank their approval of US drone strikes to target 
extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia more generally, which was 
also ranked on a 1 to 5 scale.  Finally, the survey collected relevant information about the 
respondents’ partisanship, race, age, gender, prior military service, close relationship to 
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someone who has served in the armed forces, level of education, knowledge about 
drones, and familiarity with robots. Since self-reported measures of knowledge can be 
inaccurate, respondents’ actual level of knowledge about drones was checked with a 
question requiring them to identify unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes from a 
list.  The entire survey instrument can be found in the appendix.   
 
Experimental Results 
 The sample is composed of 842 respondents. As expected, this sample is not 
entirely representative of the American public; however, in some demographics, it does 
not differ drastically. First, compared to the results from the US Census in July 2018 
showing that women make up 50.8% of the American population, the mTurk sample in 
this study overrepresents men and underrepresents women, who make up 62.47% and 
37.53% of the sample, respectively. In terms of race, the sample is 79.45% white, 9.14% 
African-American, 1.19% American Indian, and 7.48% Asian-American. Compared to 
the US public at large, whites are overrepresented, yet the percentages of African-
Americans, American Indians, and Asian-Americans are roughly equivalent. Moreover, 
those who identify as having Hispanic or Latino origin make up 13.66% of the sample, 
which closely resembles the 12.5% found in the American public at large. With regard to 
partisan identification, 45.12% of the sample report being Democratic, 29.64% as 
Republican, and 25.24% as Independent. Thus, the sample over represents Democrats, 
which a Gallup poll in February 2019 found to make up 30% of the American people 
(Gallup, 2019). Most surprisingly, the sample drastically overrepresents the percentage of 
those who have served in the US armed forces. According to a 2015 study by 
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FiveThirtyEight, 7.3% of all living Americans have served in the armed forces at some 
point in their lives (Chalabi, 2015). Interestingly, 18.41% of this sample reported having 
served in the US armed forces. In light of the composition of this sample, let us now turn 
to the findings.  
Despite self-reporting relatively high levels of familiarity with drones, the 
findings seem to confirm the general consensus in the literature that Americans possess a 
low level of knowledge about drones. When asked to self-report how much they’ve read 
or heard about drone usage by the US military, about a quarter of respondents report 
having heard either a “great deal” or “a lot” (28.21%). Furthermore, 39.17% of 
respondents report having exposure to a “moderate amount” of information about use of 
drones by the US military. When combined, the findings show that about two-thirds of 
respondents have read or heard at least a moderate amount about the US military’s use of 
drones (67.38%). Conversely, only 3.93% of respondents state that they have no 
familiarity with use of manned surveillance aircraft. Thus, these findings seem to suggest 
that US military drone usage represents a topic of interest with which many Americans 
are at least somewhat familiar. However, does this relatively high level of self-reported 
familiarity translate to actual knowledge about drones? Sadly, the answer is no. In order 
to measure respondents’ level of knowledge about drones, they were asked to identify the 
unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes from a list of US military aircraft, which 
included unmanned aircraft capable of lethal operations (e.g. MQ-1 Predator), unmanned 
aircraft only used for surveillance (e.g RQ-4 Global Hawk), and manned aircraft (e.g. F-
16). By selecting MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and RQ-7 Shadow, the respondent is 
recorded as completely and correctly answering the question. Only 1.78% of respondents 
correctly identify all three forms of unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes 
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without the selection of any incorrect answers. Given that this metric for measuring level 
of knowledge about drones is rather high for an average citizen, we also examine how 
many respondents correctly identify two of the three correct answers without the 
inclusion of any incorrect responses, which makes up 7.60% of the sample. Lowering the 
bar for knowledge even further, we also look at the amount of respondents who correctly 
identify at least two of the three correct answers but also mark an incorrect answer. These 
correct-incorrect mixed responders represent 6.41% of the sample. Interestingly, the most 
common erroneous responses that occur in conjunction with correct answers are the RQ-4 
Global Hawk, an unmanned aircraft used for surveillance, and the EA-18G Growler, a 
manned aircraft capable of lethal strikes. Also, 9.38% of respondents fail to select a 
single correct option. Finally, and perhaps most notably, 54.75% of respondents respond, 
“don’t know” and do not select any of the aircraft options. This appears to contrast with 
the findings above showing that the majority of respondents possess at least a moderate 
amount of familiarity with the US military’s usage of drones. As such, this seems to 
indicate that self-reported levels of knowledge can be overly optimistic. Thus, these 
results echo previous findings in the literature suggesting the American public knows 
very little about unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes, or as they’re commonly 
referred to, lethal drone strikes.  
Next, we turn to how respondents’ levels of approval varied across experimental 
conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the aggregated levels of approval and disapproval across 
experimental conditions. As expected, the majority of respondents approve of the usage 
of drone strikes, regardless of the particular treatment to which they were assigned. 
Surprisingly, the greatest percentage of approval can be found in the Militarily 
Ineffective condition.  
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Also, quite interestingly, the second largest percentage of approval can be found 
in the Increased Ease of Military Intervention condition. The International Law condition 
contains the lowest percentage of approval and highest percentage of disapproval, which 
mirrors the findings of preexisting literature claiming that international law concerns can 
be impactful on respondents’ level of approval (Kreps and Wallace, 2016).  However, the 
highest percentage of “neither approve nor disapprove” can be found in the International 
Law condition, which could suggest that some respondents do not fully comprehend the 
international law concerns with which they’re presented. If confused by concepts such as 
the violation of a country’s sovereignty, these respondents might feel as though they do 
not know enough to render a judgment on drone strikes in one direction or the other. 
Thus, these respondents might opt for a statement of neutrality. Conversely, respondents 
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Figure 1. Aggregated levels of approval across experimental condition.  
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in this condition could choose “neither approve nor disapprove” to reflect their conflicted 
feelings about approval. Although they admire the benefits of drone strikes, their support 
could waver after being presented with statements about violation of international law. 
Finally, the second highest percentage of aggregate disapproval can be found in the 
Militarily Effective condition, which is somewhat surprising. Despite being presented 
with the positive treatment about drones, that is, the condition emphasizing how drones 
make Americans safer, 27% of respondents in that treatment still disapprove.  
Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of respondents that fell into each approval 
category for all 4 treatments. Across all conditions, the largest percentage of respondents 
can be categorized as “somewhat approve” (35.1% in total). Those who “somewhat 
approve” outnumber those who “strongly approve” (25.7% of all respondents), which 
seems to indicate that respondents could be reluctant about wholeheartedly approving of 
drone strikes, yet still find them to be a valuable military weapon. Interestingly, the 
highest percentage of respondents who “strongly approve” can be found in the Increased 
Ease of Military Intervention condition (29.1%), followed by 28.8% in the Militarily 
Effective condition. The relatively high percentage of “strongly approve” respondents in 
the Militarily Effective condition is not surprising given the fact that those respondents 
were presented with the claim that drone strikes make Americans safer, which would 
seem to naturally increase the intensity of approval. However, the fact that the largest 
percentage of “strongly approve” can be found in the Increased Ease of Military 
Intervention condition could possibly indicate respondents’ perception of increased 
frequency of military intervention as a positive factor. Respondents might wish the US  
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 to possess the flexibility and resources to intervene militarily as it sees fit. In light of 
this, respondents’ stronger level of approval for such technology would make sense. 
The greatest percentage of "strongly disapprove" respondents can be found in the 
Militarily Effective condition (13.5%). This is somewhat surprising considering that this 
is the condition claiming that drones make Americans safer. However, this could perhaps  
be attributed to the fact that this condition explicitly states that drones kill suspected 
militants. Such straightforward language could deter respondents from approval. The 
second largest percentage of "strongly disapprove" can be found in the International Law 
condition, which does make sense. The magnitude of this percentage (11.9%) still seems 
somewhat low in light of the expectations in the majority of drone literature, which 
claims that international law violations are a major concern about drones. However, the 
fact that international law violations might be more salient to scholars than average 
citizens can be reflected in the 18.1% of respondents who neither “approve nor dis- 
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-approve” in the International Law condition.  
After the treatment, when told that a strike was going to occur regardless of their 
initial level of approval and asked whether they would prefer unmanned airstrikes or 
manned airstrikes, the vast majority of respondents across conditions still opt for 
unmanned airstrikes. For those in the Militarily Effective condition, 72.38% of 
respondents prefer unmanned airstrikes, which represents the highest percentage of those 
favoring drones across conditions. The lowest percentage of respondents demonstrating 
this preference can be found in the Increased Ease of Military Intervention; however, 
even still, 66.20% of those in this treatment choose unmanned over manned airstrikes. 
Thus, these findings show that even if respondents do not necessarily approve of them, 
they still tend to prefer drone strikes to manned airstrikes, likely due to the elimination of 
the possibility of military casualties.    
After looking at the breakdown of approval levels across experimental conditions, 
we turn now to determining which demographic factors and treatment condition influence 
the likelihood of overall approval of drone strikes most strongly. Since the levels of 
approval ranged from 1 (strongly approve) to 5 (strongly disapprove), a negative 
coefficient indicates a greater likelihood of approval. Conversely, a positive coefficient 
points to a lower likelihood of approval and a higher likelihood of disapproval.  The 
results show that the most significant predictors of overall approval of drone strikes are 
service in the armed forces, identification as a Republican, Hispanic or Latino origin, and 
having a significant relationship with someone who served in the armed forces. As 
indicated by Table 3, Republican partisanship is an extremely significant indicator of 
approval of drone strikes, which seems to be consistent with the preexisting literature       
(-1.010, p <0.01). Conversely, a bivariate regression between overall approval of 
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drone strikes and Democratic self-identification shows that Democratic respondents are 
more likely to disapprove of drone strikes. From these findings, Republicans do tend to 
be more hawkish than Democrats as suggested by previous studies.  
Table 4 illustrates how service in the 
armed forces represents another significant 
indicator of approval. Those who previously 
served in the armed forces are statistically 
more likely to approve of lethal drone 
strikes to target extremists in foreign 
countries        (-0.750, p<0.01). This finding 
makes sense given that those who were 
members of the US military likely risked 
their lives during their service. It seems 
natural that such respondents would opt for a form of military intervention that removes 
the possibility of American 
military casualties. Similarly, 
those who have a significant 
person in their lives who has 
served in the armed forces are 
also more likely to approve of 
drone strikes; however, this 
relationship is not as significant 
of an indicator as those who 
served in the armed forces themselves (-0.302, p<0.01; see Table 5).   
Table 3. Analysis of partisanship and drone strike 
approval. Standard error in parentheses.  
Table 4. Analysis of service in armed forces and drone strike 
approval. Standard error in parentheses.  
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Furthermore, those who are of Hispanic or Latino origin are significantly more 
likely to approve of drone strikes, a finding which has not been commonly studied in the 
drone literature (-0.438, p<0.01; see Table 6). With regard to gender, females are 
statistically less likely to approve of the usage of drone strikes (0.168, p<0.1; see Table 
7). This finding mirrors the results from previous studies wherein women tend to be more 
disapproving of the use of military force in general.  Finally, neither age nor level of 
education appears to be significant indicators of approval of drone strikes. Although 
those who are 40-59 years old tend to be more likely to approve of drones and those who 
are 20-39 tend to be less likely to approve, these findings are not statistically significant 
(Table 8). Similarly, respondents who hold either a bachelor’s degree or graduate degree 
are more likely to approve of drone strikes, yet these relationships fail to achieve 
statistical significance (Table 9). Overall, these findings illustrate that those who are 
Republican, Hispanic/Latino, served in the armed forces, or know someone who has 
Table 5. Analysis of significant person in life who served in the armed forces and drone strike approval. 
Standard error in parentheses.  
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served in the military are more likely to approve of drone strikes.  
 
	
Table 6. Analysis of Hispanic or Latino origin and 
drone strike approval. Standard error in parentheses.  
Table 7. Analysis of female and drone strike approval. Standard 
error in parentheses.  
Table 8. Analysis of age and drone strike approval. 
Standard error in parentheses.  
Table 9. Level of education and drone strike approval. 
Standard error in parentheses.  
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 In order to determine which experimental condition yields the greatest impact on 
the likelihood of drone strike approval, Table 10 displays the results of a multivariate 
regression of the 
treatment conditions and 
the most influential 
demographic factors. 
The Militarily Effective 
treatment was utilized as 
the baseline condition to 
which other conditions 
could be compared. A 
graphical representation 
of these findings can be 
found in Figure 3, which 
plots the average 
marginal effect across 
the conditions. First and foremost, the International Law condition produces the most 
substantial impact on approval of drone strikes compared to the other experimental 
conditions (0.162). This result thus confirms H1, which predicted that the International 
Law condition would yield the most negative impact on approval of drone strikes. 
Although this coefficient does not reach a level of statistical significance, this finding 
mirrors the results of previous studies. Furthermore, this demonstrates that the public 
does possess concerns about the international law violations inherent in drone strikes, 
Table 10. Analysis of treatment conditions, most significant 
demographic factors, and drone strike approval. Standard error in 
parentheses.  
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which lower their likelihood of approval. Neither the Militarily Ineffective condition nor 
the Increased Ease of Military Intervention produce substantial or significant impacts on 
the overall level of approval of drone strikes. Interestingly, and quite surprising, both the 
Militarily Ineffective and Increased Ease of Military Intervention conditions slightly 
increase the likelihood that a respondent will approve of drone strikes. Although this 
study does not possess any tangible evidence explaining why this result occurred, 
possible expanations for these findings will be discussed in greater depth later.  
 
H2 is partially confirmed by the findings since the Increased Ease of Military 
Intervention condition yields a weaker negative impact on public approval of lethal drone 
strikes than the International Law condition. However, as discussed above, quite 
unexpectedly, the Increased Ease of Military Intervention condition slightly increases the 
likelihood of approval, albeit not in a statistically significant fashion. This finding could 
be explained by a perception among respondents that the ability to intervene militarily in 
a foreign country with greater ease in fact represents a strength, rather than a liability, of 
drone strikes. Such repondents might believe that in order for the US to keep its citizens 
safe and maintain its military supremacy within the global order, it must possess the 
Figure 3. Average marginal effect of experimental conditions on approval.  
 
64	
capacity to intervene as it sees fit. Upon hearing that drones would enable such 
capability, respondents could be more willing to approve. Table 10 also displays similar 
findings with regard to which demographic factors are most influential in determining 
likelihood of approval of drone strikes. Republican identity and service in the armed 
forces both yield statistically significant impacts on approval wherein Republicans and 
veterans are significantly more likely to approve of drone strikes (-0.927, p<0.01; -0.433, 
p<0.01, respectively). Also, women are significantly less likely to approve of drone 
strikes in comparison to men (0.201, p< 0.05). Holding a graduate or professional degree, 
however, yields only a slight impact on the likelihood of approval.  
Figure 3 illustrates the average marginal effects of the experimental treatments 
and most significant demographic indicators. As a frame of reference, the points above 
the 0.0 line indicate a decline in approval whereas points below the 0.0 line indicate an 
increase in approval. The farther from the 0.0 line a point is, the more significant the 
relationship between the relevant factor and approval of lethal drone strikes. Also, these 
findings present relatively high margins of error, which could be due to a lack of 
representativeness in the sample. Quite clearly, one can see that being a Republican or 
veteran significantly increases the likelihood of approving of US usage of lethal drone 
strikes to target terrorists in foreign countries. These two factors also possess relatively 
lower marginal errors; that is, the effects vary less substantially than for other variables 
tested. Holding a graduate degree also appears to result in a higher likelihood of 
approval; however, this finding is not as statistically significant as other demographic 
factors tested and the range for error is considerably larger (0.119). Conversely, 
identification as a female decreases the likelihood of approval; thus, women are more 
likely to disapprove of US usage of lethal drone strikes. As seen with the other 
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statistically significant findings in this figure, the effect of being female on approval 
possesses a considerably smaller margin of error (0.086). Finally, when assessing the 
relative impacts of the experimental conditions, Figure 3 shows that only the 
International Law condition appears to produce a noticeable difference in approval. By 
comparison, both the Militarily Ineffective and Increased Ease of Military Intervention 
conditions fall below the 0.0 line, yet their seemingly insignificant distance from the 
baseline indicates that they increase respondents’ likelihood of approval only very 
slightly. Thus, these findings confirm H1, which predicted that the International Law 
condition would yield the greatest negative impact on public approval of the use of lethal 
drone strikes to target terrorists in foreign countries.   
 
Conclusion 
 In a political environment typically characterized by fissures in public opinion on 
policy, the fact that a majority of Americans support a rather controversial form of 
military technology appears quite surprising. Thus, this thesis sought to identify the 
relevant factors that influence public attitudes about lethal drone strikes used to target 
extremists in foreign countries and determine which factor produces the greatest impact 
on approval. In order to do this, I conducted a survey experiment on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
treatments—Militarily Effective, Militarily Ineffective, International Law, and Increased 
Ease of Military Intervention. All conditions presented respondents with a hypothetical 
scenario in which the US planned to execute a lethal strike using a UAV (unmanned 
aerial vehicle) to eliminate a group of extremists with suspected plans to attack the US. 
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Each condition differed with the inclusion of a relevant argument from the scholarly 
literature highlighting either a benefit or negative consequence of lethal drone strikes.  
First, my analysis showed that international law concerns exert the most 
noticeable effect on the American public’s level of approval for drone strikes, which is 
consistent with previous literature (Kreps and Wallace, 2016). That is, when presented 
with the claim that lethal drone strikes violate international law by disrupting the 
sovereignty of the targeted state and failing to appropriately prevent the occurrence of 
civilian casualties, respondents become less likely to approve. The results showed that the 
Militarily Ineffective condition produced a slight increase in the likelihood of approval, 
which seems puzzling considering that this treatment exposed respondents to a 
fundamental concern about lethal drone strikes. Although the study does not provide any 
explicit answers to make sense of these findings, a few potential explanations can be 
offered. An increased likelihood of approval in the Militarily Ineffective condition, which 
claimed that drone strikes might actually make Americans less safe, could reflect 
respondents’ distrust of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. This 
condition invoked the authority of organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism. In their 
written responses explaining their level of approval, a few respondents in this condition 
reported that they “don’t believe a single thing the UN says.” This indicates that when 
presented with a claim relying on the expertise of that organization, respondents could be 
inclined to automatically disregard that information. This explanation fits with the 
findings from Kreps and Wallace’s 2016 study, which showed that across three issue 
frames, at least 70% of respondents found the government (Joint Chiefs of Staff) credible 
whereas the UN’s credibility was relatively lower across the civilian and effectiveness 
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frames. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch was generally viewed as the least credible 
source with ratings around or below 50%. These results reflect some Americans’ 
skepticism about the motives and expertise of outside organizations, especially NGOs. As 
a result, distrust in intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations could have 
factored into Americans’ slight increase in approval of lethal drone strikes.  
Second, the results of this study showed that partisanship, prior service in the 
armed forces, and gender are the most significant predictors of approval of lethal drone 
strikes. Republicans and veterans are significantly more likely to approve of drone 
strikes, which mirrors findings from previous studies investigating the determinants of 
public attitudes regarding the use of military force. Conversely, consistent with previous 
work regarding the relationship between gender and use of military force, women are 
much less likely than men to approve of lethal drone strikes. Although drone strikes 
operate in a fundamentally different way than other forms of military force, these results 
indicate that drones share similar demographic predictors with conventional military 
technology such as manned airstrikes or ground troops.  
 Third, despite the negative impact of international law concerns on approval, the 
vast majority of respondents across all conditions still favored unmanned over manned 
airstrikes, which illustrates the extent to which the American public values US safety 
above all else. Even in the International Law condition, two-thirds (66.67%)  of 
respondents preferred unmanned to manned airstrikes. Respondents’ written responses 
clearly displayed an awareness of the cost-benefit calculus involved in the use of lethal 
drone strikes, yet the majority still stated that whatever consequences may arise represent 
only a small price to pay for America’s safety. Main concerns included the possibility of 
civilian casualties and the uncertainty of the information about the targets. Many 
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respondents were reluctant about drone strikes given the fact that the targets were only 
“suspected” extremists, and they often expressed a desire for more evidence of the 
targets’ violent intentions against the US. That being said, respondents overcame these 
doubts by sating that everything possible must be done to combat terrorism. Thus, these 
findings also indicate how the threat of terrorism continues to loom large in respondents’ 
minds. Overall, this study showed that US safety and protection of American lives trump 
all other concerns, leading to majority approval of actions required to achieve those 
goals.  
 This study leads to important conclusions in both scholarship and public policy. 
With regard to academic literature, this thesis confirms previous accounts of the 
determinants of public support for military force as well as situates those findings in the 
context of lethal drone strikes. Following in the footsteps of Kreps and Wallace’s 2016 
study, these results challenge previous arguments asserting that military effectiveness is 
more influential than international law concerns on public support for use of force (Gelpi, 
Feaver, and Reifler, 2009; Press, Sagan, and Valentino, 2013). Instead, my findings 
contribute to the growing body of literature demonstrating how international law 
concerns effectively frame public perceptions of US military actions. The results of this 
study also confirm Perla’s findings that public support for military engagements will 
increase when the public perceives the mission’s principal objective as seeking to 
confront an external threat (Perla, 2011). In this case, Americans perceived drones as 
addressing an external terrorist threat identified in a small village in Pakistan. Post 9/11, 
terrorism remains a salient concern for many Americans, especially given the recurrence 
of terrorist attacks worldwide in recent years. Furthermore, this study confirms the notion 
that the public is capable of engaging in a rational cost-benefit calculus with regard to 
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the use of military force (Larson, 1996). In their written explanations, respondents 
acknowledged a notable cost of drone strikes—civilian casualties—by expressing a desire 
to use drones in a way that minimizes the likelihood of this consequence. However, in 
light of the risks, the majority of respondents commented that protecting American lives, 
both in combat and back at home, was more important. This style of response indicates 
the presence of a cost-benefit calculus, confirming Larson’s thesis. Finally, my findings 
provide further evidence that Republicans tend to be more hawkish than Democrats 
regarding military intervention, and women often oppose the use of military force more 
strongly than men (Feinstein, 2017; Brooks and Valentino, 2011). However, the results of 
this study challenge Eichenberg’s findings that a gender gap is almost nonexistent in the 
presence of abstract, hypothetical scenarios (Eichenberg, 2003). This study’s 
experimental stimulus included a hypothetial opportunity for use of lethal drone strikes, 
yet the results clearly showed that women were less likely to approve than men.  
 With regard to public policy, my findings suggest that even in the face of 
criticisms from international organizations such as the United Nations, public support for 
lethal drone strikes remains rather durable. As discussed above, although violations of 
international law yielded the greatest negative impact on public approval, the majority of 
respondents still favored unmanned to manned airstrikes. Such a high level of public 
support for drones will likely encourage the continued usage of this technology. That 
being said, for those who wish to reduce the prevalence of US drone strikes, an appeal to 
international legal violations might offer the best avenue for diminishing public support. 
Due to the nature of the American democratic system, public support provides a critical 
foundation for the continuation of policy. Thus, arguments presented by international 
organizations could activate enough concern in the American public to the point where 
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they begin to rescind their approval and demand policy change. Even if the process does 
not occur quite this radically, such campaigns could still lead to public outcry for more 
regulation and oversight of US drone strike operations. As a result, the United States 
might have to be more selective in its choice of drone strikes.  
 In terms of future military technology policy, despite high levels of public 
approval for lethal drone strikes, the results of this study suggest that the American public 
remains apprehensive about technological malfunction, which could preclude the future 
development of increasingly autonomous weapons systems.  In their written responses, 
many participants expressed concerns about the reliability of drones, worrying that 
machines can malfunction, rely on inaccurate information, and be hacked. Some 
respondents even remarked that they would not support the use of drones if they were not 
controlled by human operators. These findings suggest that the American public’s distrust 
of technology will likely preclude their approval of increasingly autonomous weaponry 
systems (so-called “killer robots”) wherein humans are either on the loop (monitoring or 
turning off the system as necessary) or completely out of the loop (allowing an 
autonomous system to make its own choices for the completion of its mission). Thus, 
although US safety and prevention of casualties are critical to many Americans, it 
remains highly unlikely that they will be willing to support autonomous weaponry 
anytime soon.  
  Finally, this thesis provides a starting point for future avenues of research. First, 
future researchers could investigate how the Trump administration has affected the 
impact of international legal concerns on public attitudes regarding warfare. As 
evidenced by the withdrawal of the US from the United Nations Human Rights Counsel 
on June 19, 2018, the Trump administration has challenged the legitimacy of the 
 
71	
United Nations and espoused a return to patriotism rather than use of multilateralism. 
Currently, the United Nations represents one of the preeminent centers for the creation 
and preservation of international law norms. However, if the American people begin to 
internalize such patriotic, “America First” rhetoric, their perceptions of the legitimacy, 
credibility, and usefulness of the United Nations could decline. Future work could thus 
investigate whether this decline results in a decreased impact of international law 
concerns on public attitudes regarding the use of military force, especially lethal drone 
strikes.  
 Also, this work could inspire further study of the continued relevance of just war 
theory on public attitudes regarding the use of military force. That is, as means of warfare 
create more distance between the combatant and the battlefield, future work could 
investigate whether fighting and killing with “honor” is still a concern for the American 
public. One could consider whether ethical concerns will threaten to curb the 
development of remotely controlled military weaponry, which represent a shift away 
from face-to-face combat. Conversely, could lethal drone strikes act as a slippery slope 
and lower the American people’s standards for ethical conduct in wartime wherein they 
opt for convenience and security over moral issues? I suggest these as future paths for 
research in order to develop a more robust understanding of how certain factors will 
continue to influence Americans’ attitudes about drones as well as how the use of drone 
strikes could shape American public approval of the use of military force more generally.  
 In conclusion, drones’ ability to remove the possibility of American military 
casualties forms the foundation for Americans’ high levels of approval. Although these 
findings appear to be quite stable, American approval of lethal drone strikes is not 
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completely invulnerable, which speaks to the potential for future shifts in public opinion.  
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Appendix 
Consent statement:  
 
You are invited to be in a research study on public opinion. You were selected as a 
possible participant because you are 18 years old or older and a U.S. citizen. We ask that 
you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the 
study. This study is being conducted by Katherine Fink, undergraduate student at the 
University of Pennsylvania.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine your opinions about political events. If you agree 
to be in the study, you will be asked to read a few excerpts, and fill out a questionnaire. 
The session will take no longer than five (5) minutes. Of course, you can choose not to 
answer any question. 
 
There are no major risks in this study. Nonetheless, you may withdraw from the study at 
any point. You can contact the investigator if you would like to obtain the results of the 
study. If you successfully complete the survey, you will be given a code that can be 
entered into Mechanical Turk. If this code is entered correctly, you will be paid $0.50 for 
your participation in the survey.   
 
The records of this study will be kept private. We do not collect information that would 
allow us to identify respondents. In any sort of report we might publish, we will not 
include any information that will make it possible to identify a participant.         
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may choose not to answer 
any question in the survey, though we would appreciate if you would answer all of them. 
If you choose to withdraw from participating, you may do so, though if you do not 
complete the study, you will not be paid. 
 
The researcher conducting this study is Katherine Fink. If you have questions later, you 
may contact her at katfink@sas.upenn.edu. If you would like, you may print a copy of 
this form to keep for your records. If you have further questions you would prefer to 
address to someone other than the researcher, you may contact the University of 
Pennsylvania Office of Regulatory Affairs (3624 Market St, Suite 301S). 
 
I have read the above information. I consent to participate in the study. 
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Respondents are randomly assigned to one of the following experimental conditions:  
 
Militarily Effective condition:  
 
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also 
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the 
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in 
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is 
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial 
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes 
use missiles to attack targets. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that 
the strikes have been instrumental in killing suspected militants and making Americans 
safer.  
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from 
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?  
 
Strongly approve 
Somewhat approve 
Neither approve nor disapprove 
Somewhat disapprove  
Strongly disapprove 
 
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences) 
 
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If 
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target 
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?  
 
Unmanned airstrikes 
Manned airstrikes 
 
Militarily Ineffective condition:  
 
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also 
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the 
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in 
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is 
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial 
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes 
use missiles to attack targets. As a result, drone strikes eliminate the possibility of 
American military casualties. Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have indicated that the strikes trigger 
anti-US sentiment and help militants recruit new members, making Americans less safe.  
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from 
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?  
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Strongly approve 
Somewhat approve 
Neither approve nor disapprove 
Somewhat disapprove  
Strongly disapprove 
 
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences) 
 
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If 
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target 
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?  
 
Unmanned airstrikes 
Manned airstrikes 
 
International Law condition:  
 
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also 
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the 
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in 
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is 
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial 
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes 
use missiles to attack targets. As a result, drone strikes eliminate the possibility of 
American military casualties. Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have indicated that the strikes violate 
international law in two ways. First, these organizations have indicated that these strikes 
violate international law because they break the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
country where the attack takes place. Second, these organizations have indicated that 
these strikes also violate international law because they do not take necessary measures to 
prevent the death of civilians. 
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from 
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?  
 
Strongly approve 
Somewhat approve 
Neither approve nor disapprove 
Somewhat disapprove  
Strongly disapprove 
 
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences) 
 
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If 
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target 
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?  
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Unmanned airstrikes 
Manned airstrikes 
 
Increased Ease of Military Intervention condition:  
 
There has been a lot of recent discussion about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also 
known as drones, by the United States to target suspected militants. Imagine that the 
United States has discovered a group of extremists operating in a small village in 
Pakistan. This group is thought to possess plans to attack the United States. The US is 
planning to launch lethal drone strikes in support of an operation. Drones are aerial 
vehicles that can be flown without the need for a human operator, and lethal drone strikes 
use missiles to attack targets. As a result, drone strikes eliminate the possibility of 
American military casualties. Scholars have indicated that the ability to conduct strikes 
without risk to American lives will lower the threshold for authorizing lethal military 
operations, which could increase the level of American military intervention worldwide. 
Also, since drone strikes can be executed with the push of a button, some scholars have 
indicated that drone strikes could make it too easy to kill human beings.  
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from 
pilotless aircraft called drones in this scenario?  
 
Strongly approve 
Somewhat approve 
Neither approve nor disapprove 
Somewhat disapprove  
Strongly disapprove 
 
Please explain why you gave this response, in your own words? (1-2 sentences) 
 
Now imagine that a strike is going to happen whether you approved initially or not. If 
given the choice between unmanned airstrikes (drones) or manned airstrikes to target 
extremists in this scenario, which would you favor?  
 
Unmanned airstrikes 
Manned airstrikes 
 
 
All respondents see the following set of questions:  
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from 
pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, 
and Somalia?  
 
Strongly approve 
Somewhat approve 
Neither approve nor disapprove 
Somewhat disapprove 
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Strongly disapprove 
 
Have you ever served in the armed forces of the United States of America?  
  
Yes 
No 
 
Is there a significant person in your life that has served in the armed forces of the United 
States of America?  
 
Yes  
No 
 
I am:  
 
Male  
Female 
 
I consider myself to be:  
 
Caucasian (white) 
African-American 
American Indian or Native American 
Asian American  
Other 
 
Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin?  
 
Yes  
No 
 
I consider myself to be:  
 
Republican  
Democratic  
Independent  
 
My age is:  
 
18-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
Older than 69 
 
My highest level of education was:  
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Didn’t finish high school  
High school graduate, but no further schooling  
Some college, but no degree 
Community College or Associate’s Degree 
Bachelor’s degree or equivalent 
Graduate or professional degree  
 
Have you ever used, or are you currently using, robots at home or at work (e.g. a robotic 
vacuum cleaner at home or an industrial robot at work)? 
 
Yes  
No 
 
How much have you read or heard about the use of unmanned surveillance aircraft, 
sometimes called drones, by the U.S. military? 
 
A great deal 
A lot 
A moderate amount 
A little  
None at all 
 
Which of the following are unmanned aircraft capable of missile strikes? 
 
Global Hawk  
F-16 
MQ-1 Predator 
B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber 
MQ-9 Reaper 
EA-18G Growler 
RQ-7 Shadow 
Don’t know  
 
How would you characterize your level of knowledge about drones? 
 
Very high 
Somewhat high 
Neither high nor low 
Somewhat low  
Very low  
 
 
